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Introduction 
The 1960s and 1970s saw an immense proliferation of signifiers and 
practices associated with South Asian religions in the US. This trend, 
prevalent first and foremost in popular culture, had a vital impact on 
the self-expression of certain groups of young adults with regard to 
lifestyle choices, such as living arrangements and religious and 
spiritual practices. Especially those associated with the counterculture 
of that time adopted such signifiers and practices into their lifestyles, 
oftentimes disregarding their original contexts and meanings, and 
transforming them to suit their own contexts of living. This essay 
investigates the end to which South Asian religious signifiers were de-
contextualised and partly evacuated of their initial meanings in order 
to replenish them with new ones relevant to a US-American national 
context in the said decades. 
The question of why countercultural youth have been enthusiastic 
about non-Judeo-Christian religions, especially Hinduism and Buddh-
ism, is, of course, not new. From internet fora1 to more rigorously 






























2007), many spaces have been devoted to answering this question. 
The answers are usually somewhat similar in locating the appeal of 
these religions in their difference from and perceived opposition to 
Christianity as the hegemonic religion associated with the status quo 
(Oliver 2014: 135, Perone 2004: 149). It is, in short, the alleged 
novelty and difference of those religious systems that constituted their 
attraction to Westerners, especially those dissatisfied with existing 
socio-political conditions. A second similarity is the reproach of 
Orientalism and cultural appropriation directed at the counterculture: 
Rather than exhibiting an interest in understanding the complexity of 
Hindu or Buddhist religious experience and expression, countercultural 
youth are often said to have projected their own desires onto these 
religions (Oliver 2014: 175). 
To briefly comment on the first similarity of such answers, one has 
to note that the 1960s and 1970s were not the first decades in which 
Hinduism and Buddhism played a prominent role in US culture. As 
Catherine Albanese points out, nineteenth century alternative 
spiritualities from Transcendentalism to Theosophy used Hinduism "as 
a source of occult and metaphysical thought", even before Swami 
Vivekananda brought greater attention to this religion at the World’s 
Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 (1992: 301). Furthermore, 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s Beat Generation authors started 
to familiarise themselves with concepts pertaining to Buddhism and 
Hinduism and incorporated this knowledge, significantly transforming 
it, into their literature (ibid. 316, Oliver 2014: 11). Hence, an argu-
ment regarding the appeal of the novel and extraordinary aspect of 
Hinduism and Buddhism does not hold up to thorough scrutiny, as the 
use of these religions to express discontent with established lifestyles 
has been present in American literature and culture since the 1830s. 
Also, novelty and appropriation tend to be named as discrete 
characteristics of the countercultural fascination with South Asian 
religions. This essay suggests viewing these two aspects as equally im-
portant to an understanding of this fascination. The argument here is 
based on the thesis that the use of South Asian religious (particularly 
Hindu) symbolism was attractive to countercultural groups of the 
1960s and 1970s on account of an interplay of two aspects: On the 
one hand, Hindu symbols and practices allowed these groups to frame 
their grievances more effectively and, especially, to engage in a 
process which Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow term "frame 
bridging" (2000: 624). On the other hand, the integration of these 






























protest allowed for the activation of hegemonic discourses and 
stereotypes as well as for the incorporation of practices of dis-
crimination and discipline structurally homologous to those found in 
mainstream society. This ambivalent use of South Asian religious 
signifiers is the effect of two not always conscious and seemingly 
opposed desires encompassed by the counterculture, namely to bring 
about progressive social and political change, but also to assert and 
perpetuate the privileges granted by the society against which the 
protest is directed, and to do so by perpetuating its discourses and 
practices.  
To substantiate this thesis it is useful to combine Frame Theory and 
Cultural Studies approaches, which allows differentiating ambivalent 
meanings within signifiers operating as frames. Stuart Hall notes that 
codes used to formulate messages can be decoded from a "dominant-
hegemonic position" (1993: 101), upholding and stabilising existing 
power-relations, from a "negotiated" position (ibid.: 102) that 
corresponds with but also differs from "dominant definitions" (ibid.), or 
from an "oppositional" stance (ibid.: 103) marked by resistance to 
hegemony. This essay applies the same differentiation to signifiers 
functioning as frames, postulating the occurrence of ambivalent frames 
that superficially engage oppositional codes and positions, yet are also 
structured hegemonically on a deeper level.  
A frame in this context is defined as an "interpretative schema" 
(Noakes 2000: 657, Kniss and Vande Berg 2008: 90) that reduces 
complexity of real life issues. Social movements use frames to 
communicate their grievances and proposed solutions to the public and 
to potential movement adherents. Frames are also used to "bridge", or 
discursively unite, different movements and their respective goals, 
"linking [..] two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Benford 
& Snow 2000: 624). This process creates connections "between a 
movement and individuals, through the linkage of a movement 
organization with an unmobilized sentiment pool or public opinion 
cluster, or across social movements" (ibid.). Frame bridging will thus 
often give rise to a "master frame", which is "elastic", "inclusive", and 
"broad in terms of scope" (ibid.: 618), prompting various groups and 
interests to identify with it and unite behind it. Frames derive from 
"the extant stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, 






























These available meanings and signifiers are arranged according to a 
“discursive opportunity structure” that determines their proliferation 
and acceptability within a society at a specific point in time (Koopmans 
& Statham 1999: 228). Before analysing three examples of ambivalent 
frames operating within and between US countercultural groups of the 
1960s and 1970s, one must therefore first turn to the alterations in 
the "discursive opportunity structure" that facilitated a basic literacy in 
South Asian religious symbolism and predisposed publics to receive 
corresponding signifiers favourably. 
The proliferation of South Asian religious signifiers in the US in 
the 1960s and 1970s 
Frequently, the alliance of famous Westerners with religious organ-
isations that based their tenets on some form of Hinduism fostered an 
increased pop-cultural awareness. Especially the members of the 
musical group The Beatles, on account of their enormous popularity, 
managed to arouse interest in Indian cultural and religious elements 
through their well-documented personal interest and their travels to 
sites of spiritual importance in India; the incorporation of Indian 
musical elements into their art played a vital role in the cultivation of 
the said Western interest, as well (Oliver 2014: 65).  
At the same time, religious organisations headed by Indian spiritual 
teachers started to export their teachings to the West successfully in 
the same decade. The two most influential Hinduism-related organ-
isations in this context are the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness (ISKCON) and Transcendental Meditation (TM). As Sam 
Singh points out, ISKCON’s founder A. C. Bhaktivedanta availed 
himself of a general cultural enthusiasm for "Eastern thought", advanc-
ing speedily to the status of a central figure for the adherents of the 
hippie movement in the 1960s—a status facilitated by his acquaintance 
with prominent figures such as Beat-Generation poet Allen Ginsberg 
and Beatle George Harrison.2 In the late 1960s, ISKCON had already 
established chapters in New York, San Francisco, and Montreal, and 
increased its global presence to "108 temples on six continents" by the 
late 1970s.3 Soon after its establishment in America in 1965, the 
organisation’s members became recognisable not only by their 
characteristic chanting, but also by their "colorful pink and yellow 
robes" (Albanese 1992: 307). It is this organisation in particular that 






























devotees to live communally and to remain celibate and unmarried 
(ibid.: 307, 308). 
Similar to ISKCON’s employment of celebrities to promote its cause, 
the followers of TM and its inventor, Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, relied on 
the favour of "a counterculture in bloom" and the implicit advertise-
ment of a prominent group of adherents, among them Mia Farrow, 
Shirley MacLaine, and other sportspeople and musicians.4 Woodrum 
adds the Beach Boys to this group and points out that the time from 
1965 to 1968 also saw vast media interest in TM: Maharishi Mahesh 
Yogi seemed to be a constant presence on television, radio, and in the 
print media, being finally termed "Guru of the Counterculture" 
(Woodrum 1982: 94). Woo cites figures suggesting that the 1970s 
were the most successful years for this organisation, with about 
600,000 adherents by mid decade.5  
Both of the presented organisations used forms of Hindu piety relat-
ed to the ancient bhakti movement of devotion (Rochford 2007: 3). 
This movement advocated a communal lifestyle with one’s fellow devo-
tees and the performance of eulogies in the form of songs in order to 
achieve unity with the divine (Shattuck 1999: 95). The practice of re-
peating one of the divine’s many names as a mantra, and to do so in 
the form of a chant, was one of the elements of bhakti religious piety, 
as well (ibid.). These practices are vital to both TM and the rituals of 
ISKCON. Especially the latter is often identified as the chief represent-
tative of the bhakti tradition in the United States (Albanese 1992: 
307). 
TM was at that time also taught in high schools in New York, with 14 
more states in favour of its propagation; around the US, 50 
universities had already implemented classes teaching TM by that 
time.6 The reasons for this support in education were motivated by the 
positive effects TM had on the students’ interpersonal relations and 
decreased drug use.7 Other than the appeal created by famous adher-
ents, the organisation aimed to exploit claims regarding TM’s health 
benefits, as it reportedly "lowered blood pressure, relieved stress, 
increased intelligence, and even reduced crime in areas in which a 
significant proportion of the people were meditating" (Albanese 1992: 
306). To generate further appeal, the organisation underplayed its 
religiosity, until a court ruling in 1979 clearly defined it as a religion, 
banning it from schools and other public institutions (ibid.: 306f.). 
Individuals practicing ascetic lifestyles and performing the rigors of 






























ious and devotional communities, thought to possess supernatural 
powers, called siddhis (Shattuck 1999: 112f.). These siddhis are, how-
ever, also postulated to reside in every individual and be of a 
subjective rather than objective and measurable nature by some 
spiritual traditions related to Hinduism (Stutley 1998: 90). In the late 
1960s, when TM had already gathered a prominent group of followers, 
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi’s claim that his meditative practice could beget 
such siddhis, levitation in particular, attracted vast scepticism, 
especially considering his refusal to openly demonstrate these 
powers.8  American TM centres provided courses promising the 
development of such levitating capabilities, which "created publicity 
that was often negative" and which were thus discontinued (Albanese 
1992: 307). Nonetheless, the general pop-cultural resonance with 
South Asian religious signifiers was a positive one and the numbers of 
individuals engaging in some related practice allows the supposition 
that a general, if superficial, literacy in these religious concepts and 
practices must have been wide-spread among Americans in the late 
1960s. 
Grievances, frames, and ambivalences 
Racial discrimination  
A major grievance of the 1960s was related to socio-political and 
socio-economic inequalities on racial grounds. The injustice of racist 
discrimination and violence has often been identified to concentrate 
geographically first and foremost in the South, yet the urban centres of 
the North faced this problem, as well. Jim Crow, a legal and social 
system of racial segregation implemented after the Civil War and 
emancipation, impeded racial equality in the South and was active 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. This system approved the 
racial segregation of "everything from schools and buses to bath-
rooms, beaches, and drinking fountains" as well as the denial of consti-
tutionally granted voting rights and the social sanctioning of "[d]aily 
humiliations" of people of colour (Patterson 1996: 381). While the 
passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 abolished this system officially, 
attitudes remained marked by its legacy. In the North, African 
Americans faced disadvantages in the workplace, as employers were 
less likely to hire them – a circumstance that lead to significantly in-
creased unemployment and poverty rates in this demographic (ibid.). 
As Lawrence Wittner notes, conditions of "poverty, unemployment, 
slum housing, poor education, and police brutality" were present in 






























society, whose racial prejudice conditioned and perpetuated such cir-
cumstances (1978: 286). 
The grievance of racial discrimination was not only perceived by 
those whom it victimised. As the activities and desegregated consti-
tuencies of organisations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and 
others show9, this type of discrimination was perceived as a grievance 
by what McCarthy and Zald would refer to as "conscience adherents" 
(1977: 1222), those subjects not directly impacted by the oppression 
targeted by resistance. Yet evaluating white, mostly middle-class 
youth that formed part of SNCC and CORE as not directly influenced by 
racial discrimination is not necessarily generally tenable, as its 
concomitant violence did affect whites from the middle of the 1960s 
onward: Police brutality against Black communities was prevalent in 
the North as well as in the South, and protests against this brutality 
gained visibility in 1964, when some northern urban centres became 
the sites of riots (Jenkins 2003: 265). 
Some of the most notable uprisings took place in Los Angeles, 
where 34 lives were lost, in Newark, with a death toll of 26, and in 
Detroit, which saw the death of 43 people (ibid.). As Jenkins also 
states, there were riots in 75 cities in that same year of 1967 (ibid.: 
265). DiBacco cites numbers suggesting that there were "more than 
150 major urban riots in the years 1964-1968" (1991: 725). Wittner 
notes 164 such incidents for the year 1967 alone, reporting that 
Detroit suffered material damages worth 45 million dollars (1978: 
286). It is important to note that more often than not, this violence hit 
"symbols of white authority in black neighbourhoods" rather than white 
individuals (ibid.). DiBacco also reflects on the behaviour of the media 
in its coverage of racial injustice, stating that the media focused on the 
protestors’ acts of violence, failing to give an adequate picture of the 
continuous injustice that prevailed in the urban centres where there 
were Black communities (1991: 725). In light of the fact that few 
whites were actually harmed, this coverage betrays a keen anticipation 
of threat in the face of the incidences.  
The increasing militancy of some African American protest groups 
further increased this anticipation. Some white citizens felt "shocked" 
by the outspoken adversity to whites professed by some of the 
divisions in the Black Panther movement (founded in 1966) (Jenkins 
2003: 267f.). Other historians also use the noun "shock" to describe 






























against racial injustice in the cities (DiBacco 1991: 722). In this field of 
tension between activism to terminate racial injustice and the feelings 
of discomfort and threat in the face of the violence this injustice 
triggered in the affected communities, some countercultural white 
conscience adherents and constituents of the organisations favouring 
the Civil Rights Movement made use of the Hindu concept of karma. 
Karma as a frame 
Karma, characteristic of mainly Hinduism, but also relevant in the 
contexts of Buddhism and Jainism (Becke 1996: 44), represents a 
major concept appropriated by the counterculture. It postulates that 
the deeds of present lifetimes determine the conditions of coming ones 
according to a moral code operating on the binary distinction between 
good and evil (ibid.: 45). Karma is thus most often described as a 
relentless law of causality (Ellinger 1989: 17). It is argued here that 
karma plays a chief role in constructing and framing the principles of 
causality regarding racial inequality and the upsurge of racial violence 
in the 1960s. In this manner, a master frame of 'responsibility' con-
nected to the specific karma frame comes into existence.  
Vocabularies of bewilderment have pervaded the discourse of racial 
conflict in white media and white Christian discourse since the 1950s10, 
presenting this conflict as a matter intrinsically hard to understand. 
This representation can be read as an essential part and telling sign of 
a privileged position, in which a presumed ignorance shields the 
privileged of an awareness of personal implication and responsibility 
regarding the oppressive structures—a mechanism that Critical 
Whiteness Studies scholar Aretha Schwarzbach-Apithy would call 
"[d]as Privileg der Unkenntnis" (2005: 248). A privileged ignorance of 
the causalities leading to the violent protests can be understood as one 
such mechanism of a perpetuation of oppression. In this instant, a 
discourse stemming from the concept of karma has the potential of 
calling to mind the historical and social causalities that lead to the 
violence faced by the Black and witnessed by the white populations of 
the cities.  
An example of this use of a transcendent narrative of cause and 
effect as enabled by the concept of karma is found in one of New York 
City’s underground press magazines of the late 1960s, the East Village 
Other.11 This magazine was independently produced and distributed by 
a loosely organised group of individuals known as the Yippies, who 






























contributor to the magazine, Elfrida Rivers, interprets the problems of 
racism in the USA as follows in an esoteric column that engages 
directly the questions of readers sent to the magazine: 
Current Black violence – here and in Africa – is probably 
descending upon the white races because of their historical 
position; the American settlers in particular incurred a frightful 
racial karma in committing what amounted to genocide upon the 
Indians. (Rivers 1969: 20) 
This quote renders visible both progressive statements and 
conservative omissions that characterise the use of South Asian 
religious concepts. The establishment of connections between the 
colonial history of the USA, the race violence of the 1960s, and the 
anti-colonial struggle in Africa can be evaluated as comparatively 
progressive and accurate. Historians and social activists would 
generally agree on the relatedness of the struggles to fight what can 
be interpreted as internal colonisation of oppressed minorities (e. g. 
Gutiérrez 2004) and the larger battle against the imperialist colonisa-
tion rooted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Black activists 
of the 1960s like Eldridge Cleaver also identified this connection and 
called for the liberation of "black colonial subjects who are held in 
bondage" discussing the situation of African Americans in the US 
(1995: 171).  
Here, the concept of karma functions as a discursive tool that 
enables these relations to be explicitly stated without resorting to con-
tested political vocabularies. On account of its pop-cultural valorisation 
the concept of karma can now serve to establish a connecting frame 
between two social movements, namely the one "set of […] various 
spokespersons" (cf. Tilly 1978: 12) opposing racial discrimination 
within the US, and the other set that formulates as its major grievance 
the ongoing colonisation of African countries. At the same time, the 
reference to "American settlers" activates the discourse of American 
Indian rights, likewise addressed by social movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Alluding to the evictions and murders of the colonial era, 
the quoted text establishes a causal connection between race violence 
in the 1960s and the history of race violence in colonial America. Using 
the concept of karma in that manner, the text represents racial 
violence as an overarching nexus causative of grievances that not only 
affect one minority group, but several, and that have potential conse-






























A mentioned characteristic is the seemingly apolitical vocabulary 
with which the socio-political issue is addressed, potentially expanding 
the reach of the frame thus constructed. As stated, the privileged often 
refuse, consciously or not, to recognise their implication into processes 
and practices of oppression. Hence, the use of a religious and pop-
culturally valorised concept can be conducive to a frame’s expansion, 
designing a discursive structure that less drastically discloses the 
personal political implication of the privileged individual into oppressive 
socio-political formations (c.f. McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1225). A frame 
avoidant of political vocabularies that directly impeach privilege and its 
fundamental role in perpetuating oppression is better able to mobilise 
these privileged subjects to join or view favourably the political cause 
in question. In this manner, the master frame of 'responsibility' does 
not appear to indict specific individuals, but elucidates the causality of 
oppression and resistance on the basis of historical developments 
removed from individual experience. However, this very tactic of 
depoliticising the political is one of many ambivalent traits of karma as 
a frame. 
The ambivalence of karma as a frame 
The avoidance of political vocabularies can prove a problematic omis-
sion, catering to an indiscriminate wish to assert privilege through the 
appropriation of both, non-Western religious concepts and the 
discourses of agency that are required to subvert the infrastructures of 
oppression. The fact "that some hippies rejected the very idea that 
they should be politically active" (Issitt 2009: 47) is treated as 
common knowledge by scholars, who cast many countercultural groups 
as fundamentally sceptical of politics generally and therefore intent-
ionally apolitical. This attitude implies that rather than a serious socio-
political endeavour, the struggle against oppression becomes a life-
style, of which the use of non-Western religious practices and anti-
establishment political attitudes are part. This position, however, in its 
lack of intellectual and political rigor, asserts rather than questions 
one’s own privilege, particularly the abovementioned privilege of igno-
rance. This effect can be read to point to a general problem occurring 
with practices and processes of frame bridging and the mobilisation of 
conscience constituents: While the expansion of concepts and the use 
of pop-culturally valorised signifiers are useful to mobilise conscience 
adherents, they can also signify a performance of the privilege already 






























While the concept of karma allows for a discussion of the historical 
connections in the practices and effects of racism, it also allows for an 
implicit discursive perpetuation of the very same racism. This 
argument echoes the Weberian analysis of this concept’s use in 
legitimising inequality in the form of the caste system in Hindu socio-
cultural contexts (cf. Milner 1993: 299). Particularly problematic is the 
location of both, cause and effect of racist violence in those subjected 
to it. The column states that there is a reason why minorities are dis-
criminated against, and this reason has been, according to the author, 
largely brought about by the minorities themselves, albeit in previous 
lives (cf. Rivers 1969: 8, 20). 
In a mixture of Hindu and Christian terminologies, the author main-
tains that experiencing violence was necessary to effectuate atone-
ment for sins committed in previous existences. This turn of argument 
evaluates the discrimination and violence against minorities as 
potentially positive acts from which victims will reap benefits in the 
form of forgiveness for crimes allegedly committed by them collectively 
throughout history. The description of this process implies that the 
crimes committed against minorities at the time of writing are justified 
and serve a noble purpose, even if that purpose will not unfold its 
effect in the lifetime of the generation in question. To put it more poig-
nantly, violence is depicted as a spiritual favour and occurrences of 
discrimination follow, in effect, a specifically traceable logic in a correct 
order of historical events and spiritual as well as moral imperatives.  
The suggestion that violence and discrimination serve the eventual 
good of minorities, of course, fits into a colonialist and paternalistic 
argument. The legal philosophy of paternalism was developed in the 
South in the 1840s as a response to abolitionist and economic press-
ures from the North (cf. Oakes 2010; Cottrol 1987). James Oakes 
identifies a "racialized ethic of 'Christian stewardship' whereby whites 
would accept their responsibility for the care and feeding of their 
inherently inferior slaves" (2010: 589) as the main element of 
southern paternalism and further states that "racial paternalism was 
closely related to the most dehumanizing elements of proslavery 
rhetoric" (ibid.: 590). Robert J. Cottrol also references the binary of 
"black dependence" and "white responsibility" (1987: 366) as the main 
structuring element of the "set of apologetics" (ibid.: 365) which he 
identifies paternalism to be. The actual goal of the implementation of 
paternalism in white Southern culture was to dictate a particular code 
of behaviour to slave owners, preventing them from using violence and 






























mately a measure of "slave control" (Oakes 2010: 589). In the case of 
the use of the concept of karma in the East Village Other, structural 
similarities with the tenets of paternalism are evident. The part of the 
responsible parent is implied to have been transferred, by virtue of 
elusive metaphysical laws, on the hegemonic oppressors in all of the 
major conflicts and atrocities of the twentieth century (cf. Rivers 1969: 
8, 20). 
Yet there also seems to be an unexpected conclusion when the 
column states that violent protests undertaken by African Americans 
are a punishment for past crimes committed by whites. This seems to 
represent an inversion of the paternalistic scheme with its initial distri-
bution of roles along the binary of "dependency" vs. "responsibility". In 
this case, as mentioned, paternal agency seems to have been trans-
ferred to those whom it has been historically denied. However, this 
superficially transformational conclusion has limits that emerge as 
soon as one applies the concept of karma stringently. After all, this 
discourse implicitly equips one to argue that the discrimination faced 
by African Americans in the 1960s, the original grievance preceding 
the violent protests, is the continuation of a type of deserved punish-
ment administered by the white oppressors, who are then once again 
elevated to the status of educators. Protestors resisting oppression are 
then once again reduced to the level of ignorance and dependence. 
Since this particular use of the concept of karma implies a specific guilt 
on the part of the past generations of those faced with violence now, it 
considerably limits the justification of protest or even self-defence 
against the violence experienced. Resistance is thus implicitly under-
stood as counterproductive, as it stems from the alleged ignorance of 
the spiritual mechanisms at work. Here, the functional homology of the 
concept of karma as a simplifying frame and the philosophy of patern-
alism grow visible, as both betray a keen interest in controlling 
oppressed populations. In a move of discursive intimidation, karma as 
frame for racial discrimination induces the speaker employing it to am-
bivalently turn against the group with which she professes to side. 
The rigidity of social roles and family structures 
The 1950s are stereotypically seen as a time in which the nuclear 
family gained paramount cultural importance in the US, imposing strict 
gender-based social roles and behavioural patterns on individuals. The 
traditional expectations that middle-class individuals were to meet in 






























women. The normativised role of females in a white middle-class set-
ting was that of mothers and wives confined to the private space of the 
home, more specifically the suburban house, while the role of males 
seemed to comprise little more than that of breadwinners (cf. Friedan 
1963: 16). According to John Robert Greene’s overview of 1960s 
society, the Commission on the Status of Women, brought into 
existence by John F. Kennedy in 1961, failed to act in accordance with 
its professed objective of improving the situation of women, sug-
gesting instead that plans upholding conservative gender roles should 
be financed (2010: 111). 
In starkest contrast to this recommendation, the activists and 
adherents of the Women’s Liberation movement called for a radical 
questioning of such traditional gender roles (ibid.: 115). Especially in 
the light of post-war social developments that seemed to curtail free-
doms achieved during the Great Depression and World War II, such a 
mobilisation seemed necessary. One example is the issue of what 
James T. Patterson calls "sex-segregated employment", which signi-
ficantly increased after the war, leading to three-fourths of all Ameri-
can working women being employed in "female-only jobs" after the 
1950s (1996: 33). This circumstance leads Patterson to note that 
"[g]ender segregation at work was by then greater than in 1900 and 
sharper than segregation by race" (ibid.). 
As Patterson further points out, the spheres of political activism 
were no less contaminated with gender-bias than was the mainstream. 
In various social movements during the late 1960s, women’s roles 
remained limited to the chiefly domestic tasks of taking care of 
catering and cleaning, while oftentimes being confronted with sexist 
harassments and not receiving appropriate representation in decision-
making bodies (Patterson 1996: 645). This discrepancy lead many 
female activists to organise groups of their own dedicated specifically 
to the cause of Women’s Liberation, contending for "reproductive 
freedom, the legalization of abortion, changes in family dynamics, and 
[…] lesbian rights" as well as equal pay for equal work (ibid.: 646).  
Yet not only women felt limited by the institutions of capitalist 
patriarchy during the 1960s. Texts by male writers of that and earlier 
periods suggest that privileged roles for men as providers and patri-
archal leaders were also restrictive, exploitative, and at odds with 
personal conceptions of a worthwhile existence. Narratives of escape 
and alternative lifestyles by authors of the Beat Generation, such as 






























male characters often thwart social norms, engage in forms of 
sexuality unacceptable to their conservative contemporaries, reject 
their insertion into the capitalist marketplace, and experiment with 
drugs (On the Road, Naked Lunch). Ken Kesey as the most recognised 
representative of countercultural fiction (Oliver 2014: 74) took up 
most of these themes. The fact that his best-known character, 
McMurphy, is confined to a mental asylum and, along with his all-male 
fellow inmates, is systematically abused by Ms. Ratched, the head 
nurse (One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest), indicates that the privilege 
of masculinity was not unequivocally synonymous with power and 
security from oppression in the 1960s. 
In this socio-cultural tension, Greene locates the emergence of the 
hippie movement. Quoting from 1960s activist Guy Strait, Greene 
defines a hippie as an individual who negates social demands such as 
"traditional fashion trends; the desire to make money and to own 
property; the need to keep up with the middle-class Joneses" (2010: 
140). Greene asserts that the communal lifestyle was one of the most 
vital traits of the counterculture because it fortified this negation by 
deviating from prevalent individualist and consumerist social norms, 
providing refuge from the perceived "dehumanization" of a society that 
extolled "mechanical standards of efficiency" (ibid.: 141). The next 
sections elucidate how the commune became a vital countercultural 
frame, helping to protest the limitations of a conservative mainstream, 
while also structurally reproducing its biases.  
The commune as a frame 
Religious communities that gather in order to worship form an intrinsic 
part of different South Asian religious expressions (Ellinger 1989: 
103). Hindi religious piety has often been experienced in ascetic and 
monastic groups that assemble outside of traditional communities in 
order to escape the implications of the secular world (Stietencron 
2001: 35f.). These characteristics also apply to ISKCON, whose mem-
bers adhere to a communal lifestyle devoted to their religious 
practices. As E. Burke Rochford’s qualitative study of participants in 
ISKCON shows, in the 1970s attachments to family members were 
discouraged and participants were called to identify with the religious 
movement instead. Also, ISKCON propagated asceticism, vegetarian-
ism, and devotion to the eponymous deity; furthermore, the "chanting 
of the Hare Krishna mantra" formed part of this religious community’s 






























Communal lifestyles as popularised by these organisations provided 
an example of how to practically contradict conservative social struc-
tures. Greene points out that the 1960s produced over 2,000 rural and 
5,000 urban communes, also stating that over two million Americans 
participated in communal lifestyles (2010: 141). Naturally, these 
communes were not all devoted to the religious practices proposed by 
the mentioned religious sects, but were mostly experimenting with 
different forms of social organisation beyond the patriarchal and hete-
ronormative mandates of the decade (ibid.). The best-known and 
largest communes were of an agricultural character, requiring partici-
pants to engage in some form of husbandry and food production, 
encouraging a "Back to the Land" attitude and taking interest in 
environmentalist causes: Vegetarianism, sharing, and avoiding excess 
in the accumulation of personal goods was encouraged in most 
communes (Issitt 2009: 50, 52-4). 
According to Rochford, "two-thirds of the devotees who had joined 
ISKCON between 1967 and 1971 had previously participated in the 
counterculture", and "[o]ver half of the early converts to Krishna had 
taken part in the anti-war movement" (1991: 66). This data shows 
that the communal practices proposed by these religious organisations 
resonated with the sentiments of a mobilised demographic that 
identified with the manifold grievances represented in the loose 
formations of the counterculture, specifically sympathising with the 
anti-war movement. This fact suggests that ISKCON’s communal 
aspect, among other elements, appealed to a large variety of 
countercultural subjects and their respective grievances (cf. Kniss & 
Vande Berg 2008: 90). ISKCON’s countercultural appeal implies that 
the discourses of community were adequate tools in mobilising 
adherents of different protest groups, thus functioning as a frame 
bridging device across social movements and their adherents (Benford 
& Snow 2000: 624). The master frame thus constructed can be called 
'alternative/ independent community'. 
Oliver shares this rather general observation, stating that 
"[c]ommunes offered the possibility of a simpler, non-exploitative 
lifestyle which appeared to link well with the other values of the 
counterculture" (2014: 106). This observation of a general com-
patibility between the counterculture and a communal lifestyle can be 
further differentiated. As mentioned before, ISKCON clearly discourag-
ed its members from marriage and sexuality; existing families were 
often separated, the children taken care of in the organisation’s board-






























(Rochford 2007: 8). This points to the commune’s suitability to provide 
a frame directed against conservative social roles and family values.  
Two other relevant political grievances concern modes of work and 
environmental protection. Instead of inserting themselves into capital-
ist processes of production that divide the worker from decision-
making processes, the communards endeavoured to be self-sufficient 
and independent farmers. Their food choices and their modes of work-
ing the land exhibited environmentalist enthusiasm absent from indus-
trialised, capitalist society. The weakening of rigid social roles was in 
that manner linked with opposition to capitalism and environmental 
pollution. Thus, the commune operated as a framing bridge between 
the ideologically related interests of countering gender-based social 
roles, resisting capitalism, and endorsing environmentalism. At the 
same time, Rochford’s research suggests a strong affiliation with the 
cause of opposing militarism. 
Communal living mobilised beneficiaries, who temporarily escaped 
the structures of a patriarchal, heteronormative, capitalist society. 
Again, this particular instance of the use of a religious practice also 
appears to be conspicuously apolitical and rooted in a pop-cultural 
infatuation with alternative lifestyles rather than the felt need for 
political protest. Nonetheless, the evident political activism of a 
significant part of the participants of some of the religious communities 
suggests that the frame of the commune can serve as a frame bridging 
device between different social and political interest groups. 
The ambivalence of the commune as a frame 
Historians often represent countercultural communes as egalitarian, 
emphasising their critical stance towards traditional notions of family 
life, their liberating attitudes towards sexuality, and their absolute 
rejection of the militarism that forcefully imposed itself on society on 
account of the Vietnam War. Individual experiences in countercultural 
communes, however, differed from these representations. One 
instance of recorded memories of daily life in a commune is the blog 
Growing up on a Hippie Commune that features the childhood 
recollections of Celeste, who grew up on one of the largest communes 
in the USA called "The Farm".  
In the case of this not primarily religious commune, located in rural 
Tennessee and lasting into the 1980s, the material living conditions 
were reminiscent of a military camp in the wilderness. As Celeste 






























hippy commune", the housing used by the communards comprised 
army camp tents and old busses on a piece of land removed from 
other settlements or cities; communication with society outside the 
commune was strictly monitored and generally disapproved; food was 
rationed and food choices depended on practicability and functionality 
rather than on preference or taste.12 
Differences in accommodational arrangements also feature 
prominently in Celeste’s descriptions of her earliest childhood 
memories: As the account in a post called "My First Memory" 
intimates, accommodation, which featured only one single house on 
the territory of the commune during the first years, induced doubts 
regarding equality and hierarchy on the part of the child: 
I stared at the house wishing and wondering what it’d be like to 
live in one and sleep in a real bed. I had been inside before and 
could picture the tiny dark hallway with no windows where 
several bunkbeds were piled together lining both sides of the 
walls. Those children were so special to live in a house and sleep 
in those beds. How I longed to be special too. 
I played alone in the sandbox while the house kids ran in and 
out and around the house playing their games. I was different. I 
lived in a tent. When it was warm we’d roll up the tent walls. My 
mother seemed to be very happy with our tent…but oh how I 
fantasized about those real beds.13 
While the writer does not provide information concerning the criteria 
that determined the accommodation of specific people, and while the 
circumstances of dwelling in a tent seem to have been endured volun-
tarily by the writer’s mother, the main emotional response elicited in 
the writer is one of lack and deprivation, coupled with concerns 
regarding one’s position in the group hierarchy. This accommodational 
differentiation and its concomitant function as a hierarchical marker 
are particularly reminiscent of military practice, regarding both, mate-
rial arrangements and ideology.14 While Celeste’s commune did not 
seem to arrange accommodational privileges in a deliberate manner, 
the disparity in this allocation still produced a sharp awareness of 
inequality in the child and sparked musings as to this disparity’s 
justification, which manifested themselves in the description of the 
privileged with the adjective of "special" in contrast to a self-
description as "different". 
Religious communities paralleled the structure of military living 






























the following summary of the Hare Krishna house commune in San 
Francisco by W. J. Rorabaugh: 
Some houses were overtly religious, such as those established by 
the Hare Krishna followers. The leader, A. C. Bhaktivedanta, 
opposed drugs. "You don’t have to take anything for your spiritual 
life," he advised. Each member had a shaved head, wore a 
saffron robe, performed chants frequently, and sold literature or 
begged for alms on nearby sidewalks. More than fifty young 
people, mostly males, crammed into the Hare Krishna house in 
Berkeley. They lived on a vegetarian diet that ran heavily on 
brown rice. It was suspected that some of them were either draft 
dodgers or runaway soldiers. They took Krishna names and 
denied to police having prior identities. As monks, they were not 
eligible for the draft. (2015: 172) 
Especially the phenomenon of "draft dodgers" seeking refuge in the 
Hare Krishna community elucidates the paradox resulting from the 
interplay between the avowed goal of choosing this communal lifestyle, 
namely to evade the military, and this lifestyle’s day to day reality. 
This paradox is particularly visible when identifying the structural 
similarities between the communal lifestyle’s disciplines and the 
disciplines of military life: The prohibition of drugs, the shaving of the 
head, the wearing of uniform garments, the participation in mandatory 
activities to ensure the ideological reproduction of the group, the 
regimentation of eating habits and food choices, the homosocial living 
environment, the lack of privacy in overly crowded facilities, and the 
momentary denial of one’s own identity in favour of a group identity all 
apply to both, the Hare Krishna community in Berkeley and to common 
military practices. Under these circumstances, the draft dodgers’ 
decision to join the commune in order to escape the military seems 
highly paradoxical, if not ironic, when one takes into account the 
structural similarities between the military and the communal 
lifestyles.  
Furthermore, the reasons for the frugal food choices were not 
merely symbolic assertions of group identity and delimitations from 
outside society, establishing difference between the undisciplined 
bodies of the mainstream and their disciplined communal counter-
parts; they were primarily dictated by economic conditions (ibid. 2015: 
175). This rather commonplace practice of allowing scarcity of means 
to discipline one’s habits is, however, vested in a spiritual and 
oppositional code. In other words, the processes by which the body is 
made "docile" as well as subject to surveillance and which according to 






























(1995: 136f.) are thus incurred voluntarily by the communards and 
under the pretence of resistance. 
This similarity to hegemonic notions of useful bodily disciplines also 
perpetuates itself in the enforcement of parental authority. In contrast 
to common representations of communal life, a conservative notion of 
parental authority enforced by corporal punishment survived even 
among the hippies, as Celeste emotively recalls her misgivings 
regarding the consequences of eating cat food with other children: "I 
hate getting in trouble, I hate getting spanked. I try very hard to be a 
good kid, so I don’t risk things like sneaking cat food myself. I kind of 
wish I had the nerve to be so bad, but I don’t".15 The fact that 
"spanking" was present in Celeste’s experience for something relatively 
trite, in spite of the fact that her mother was strongly devoted to the 
ideals of the commune, points to the perseverance of coercive 
approaches to child rearing in the communes.  
The issue of sanctioned violence against children in spiritual com-
munes during the late 1960s and throughout the following decade has 
been sufficiently exposed to further belie the representation of the 
commune as unambiguously liberating. Rochford maintains that the 
exact number of children who suffered from criminal abuse in 
ISKCON’s boarding schools cannot be determined with precision, but 
still adduces data suggesting that one-fourth to three-fourths of the 
children faced some degree of abuse (2007: 75). According to Nori J. 
Muster, the 1970s and 1980s saw around 800 children subjected to 
"criminal neglect, emotional, physical, or sexual abuse" while 
accommodated at ISKCON.16 The scale of the abuse indicates that 
these communal living arrangements, separating children from 
parents, escalated the disparity of power always already existing 
between adults and children, instead of ameliorating it by instituting 
more egalitarian relations between generations. Furthermore, the 
structural similarities to the exposed cases of child abuse in main-
stream Christian boarding schools grows apparent in this instance and 
once again points to the fundamental ambivalence of the frame of the 
commune. 
The media and the Vietnam War 
The countercultural discontent with the media’s positioning was part-
icularly acute when coverage of the Vietnam War and of demonstra-
tions was concerned. The 1968 incident of My Lai is often evaluated as 






























Lai, a Vietnamese village of innocent people thought by the American 
military to harbour Viet Cong combatants, was attacked by American 
soldiers, leaving several hundred people dead (Greene 2010: 128). 
The military could cover up the event for over a year before the accu-
rate information was retrieved by the press and made public. This 
occurrence is but one instance that gave rise to the particular griev-
ance of media distrust among countercultural individuals and encour-
aged forms of protest reflecting it. 
While some historians give individual journalists of that era credit in 
the matter of My Lai for critically evaluating military records and even-
tually overcoming the obfuscation tactics employed by the military 
(ibid.: 131), war coverage generally betrayed hegemonic allegiances. 
In his analysis of artists’ responses to incidents such as My Lai, Francis 
Frascina offers a detailed overview of the general attitude prevalent in 
late 1960s media. He points out that already the Tet Offensive of early 
1968 effectuated an increasingly "critical edge" in news coverage 
(Frascina 1995: 494). This "critical edge", however, did not last long 
enough to render the media truly autonomous in relation to the gov-
ernment, as it continued to count on White House data and to uphold 
"the line of official optimism" regarding the war (ibid.; also Hallin 
1984: 6). Frascina evaluates this dependence as "a form of self-
censorship which replicated and colluded with the political 'estab-
lishment'" (1995: 494). 
Media adherence to the government’s narrative also crystallised in 
the coverage of anti-war protests. 50,000 to 150,000 people attended 
the March on the Pentagon in 1967; the higher number is provided by 
the organisers of the protest, while the government’s estimates are 
considerably lower (Lytle 2006: 243). In the course of the demon-
stration, clashes between the activists and the police occurred. The 
media supported mostly those in power and blamed the demonstrators 
for the escalation, with reports being "almost vicious in denouncing the 
protestors" (ibid.). The selective representation of the events failed to 
reflect the reality of police brutality that the protestors faced; it also 
failed to engage objectively with the protestors’ reasons of criticising 
the war, retaining a bias favouring the government and supporting a 
conservative view on cultural contention (ibid.: 245). 
Instead of reporting objectively, the media were generally perceived 
to criminalise the activists. Frascina cites several instances of reporting 
that established discursive connections between famous criminals and 






























coverage of the murders carried out by the group around Charles 
Manson, repeatedly referring to the murderers as "hippies". The form-
ation of such a discursive link that sought to criminalise opposition to 
the executive’s policies formed part of a government strategy, which 
the press incorporated into its style of reporting (Frascina 1995: 
502f.). The media thus enhanced the government’s efforts to delegiti-
mise protest against its policies. However, there were activists who 
used specific strategies to make the media, albeit unwittingly, com-
plicit in advertising the social movements involved in demonstrations.  
Spectacle as a frame 
An important element of South Asian religious practices is the staging 
of religious ceremonies, often perceived as spectacles by foreign 
onlookers. While not exclusive to the realm of South Asian religious 
practice, it is one of the most widely perceived elements of both TM as 
well as of ISKCON, who until today incorporate both chanting and 
staging their worship into their religious practices and display these 
publically. It was the March on the Pentagon which contained a notable 
use of South Asian religious signifiers to stage a protest against the 
Vietnam War. March participant Jo Freeman reports, "[a]t the other 
end a group of hippies was trying to exorcize the Pentagon. The 
brainchild of Abbie Hoffman, the plan was for people to sing and chant 
until it levitated and turned orange, driving out the evil spirits and 
ending the war in Viet Nam. The Pentagon didn't move".17 
It is of interest that the diverse array of groups and movements 
present in the march contained a fraction of ISKCON adherents, who 
together with participants of the Women’s Liberation Movement, the 
Yippies, and the adherents of other movements participated in a 
protest event staged as the "Levitation of the Pentagon" (cf. Windt 
1990: 233). This participation, together with the theme of the 
spectacle, shows that the resonance of the religious concepts referenc-
ed was sufficiently wide to be employed in a setting in which diverse 
interest groups and activists converged. Levitation, as the most 
notable signifier invoked by the Yippies, is one of the siddhis that pro-
ponents of TM claimed to be linked to their meditative practice.  
This instance of the Yippies’ "guerrilla theater" was utilised "to con 
the media into advertising the cultural politics of the hippie and New 
Left" communities (Lytle 2006: 243). Focusing on the Yippies’ main 
organiser, Abbie Hoffman, Nadine Bloch provides this favourable 






























while at the same time employing the media to proliferate counter-
cultural ideas: 
Abbie Hoffman was an astute observer of the media, which 
helped him create events that the media would love. There had to 
be conflict, chaos and challenges to the status quo, and there had 
to be music, costumes and other trappings of the counterculture 
to stand in contrast with everything else. The exorcism and 
levitation of the Pentagon was a direct reaction to the mani-
pulation of the news about the Vietnam War, which seemed like 
so much smoke and mirrors to those opposed to the war. Fighting 
such absurdity with anything short of the same seemed 
counterproductive and insignificant, because the mass media was 
so good at its war-mongering job.18 
Bloch’s account of the theatrical character of Hoffman’s events 
accurately takes into consideration the general opinion on the dubious 
interrelations of the media and the administration responsible for the 
war. Her description also explicates the mechanism by which the 
employed religious signifiers not only function to bridge frames 
between different social movements and interest groups, but also to 
reflect incredulity towards the official narratives, which are implicitly 
equated with the Yippies’ exaggerated, spectacular shows. In this 
manner, the act of staging a spectacle using religious signifiers is 
productive of another discourse, namely that of deceit and lack of 
trustworthiness.  
This discourse is indicative on its part of a significant grievance, 
which can be described as an absence of trust into the media and 
official news. As a hegemonic conditioning device, the media was 
targeted by many oppositional groups who saw themselves misrepr-
esented by the same. While this issue was most pertinent to the anti-
war movement, which decried the media’s complicity with the govern-
ment to justify military action in Vietnam, the point of contact with 
movements such as Women’s Liberation and Civil Rights in expressing 
discontent with the media is evident. In the case of Hoffman’s use of 
spectacle, the master frame implicitly constructed through the exag-
gerated and mocking use of South Asian religious practices and 
signifiers can be formulated as 'distrust', which conceptually united the 
social activists present at the march. 
The ambivalence of spectacle as a frame 
Regarding the practice of adopting highly visible and carnivalesque 






























using the mentioned set of religious signifiers. After all, the culmi-
nation of the March on the Pentagon was the spectacular levitation 
ceremony. Levitation, as explained, is a feature of one of the most 
cliché-ridden representations of Hindu ascetics. One could note that 
the countercultural agents engaged in these enactments of protest 
experienced their agency chiefly by virtue of the process of cultural 
appropriation and commodification in relation to an implicitly defined 
Other. In this act of cultural appropriation the protesters invigorated a 
hegemonic construction of a totalised, stereotypical "Orient" that 
heavily relied on colonialist discourses of the carnivalesque, of alleged 
Oriental disorder, and of indolent spirituality.  
This particular instance of the appropriation of various non-Judeo-
Christian religious signifiers by the Yippies resembles practices of cele-
brating carnivals and masquerading in eighteenth-century England. 
Writing about the concept and practice of the carnivalesque in English 
literature and culture of that period, Terry Castle notes optimistically: 
Granted, one might see in foreign costume a mere displacement 
of imperialist fantasy; the popularity of the masquerade coincided 
after all with the expansion of British imperialism, and the 
symbolic joining of races could conceivably be construed as a kind 
of perverse allusion to empire. Yet at a deeper level, such 
travesties were also an act of homage – to otherness itself […]. 
Stereotypical and innaccurate [sic!] though they often were, 
exotic costumes marked out a kind of symbolic interpenetration 
with difference – an almost erotic commingling with the alien. 
Mimicry became a form of psychological recognition, a way of 
embracing, quite literally, the unfamiliar. The collective result was 
a utopian projection; the masquerade’s visionary "Congress of 
Nations" – the image of global conviviality […] (1986: 61f.) 
Judging from the self-representation of the Yippies, their carnivalesque 
use of South Asian religious signifiers can be read to constitute an 
"homage" of sorts, albeit one within the context of a heavily 
imbalanced power structure that grew out of a history of colonialism. 
This imbalance may impede the description of the processes as 
"homage" in both situations, for that term seems to euphemise the 
very "perverse allusion to empire" and appropriation present in both 
events. Even the metaphoric "Congress of Nations" that Castle sees in 
the embodiment of orientalist stereotypes by Westerners seems per-
tinent when drawing parallels to the Yippies: The political cause of the 
opposition to the war in Vietnam certainly called for international dia-
logue in a democratic setting that the term of a "Congress of Nations" 






























Yet the problem with this "utopian projection" of a "global con-
viviality" is its very ambiguity: While the image of a world in which all 
nations share amicable relations is certainly stereotypically utopian, 
the very act of the masquerade implies that such a normative utopia 
can best be achieved when it is the Westerner’s voice that assumes 
the Other’s place inside the costumes the Other is imagined to wear 
and in the religious rituals the Other is imagined to perform. In 
conclusion, a retaining of the Other’s form with the simultaneous 
eviction of its voice seems to lie at the heart of both spectacles, while 
both uphold the stereotype of the "Oriental masquerade" (Said 1979: 
160) as a structuring element. 
Especially the emphasis on the spectacular warrants an analysis of 
the orientalisation performed in those events. The use of South Asian 
religious signifiers in the staging of spectacular protest affirms an 
alleged bond between South Asian religious practices and the 
characteristic of the spectacular, the opulent, and the excessive. As 
Edward Said remarks, "[b]ecause it is made into a general object, the 
whole Orient can be made to serve as an illustration of a particular 
form of eccentricity"; therefore "[t]he Orient is watched, since its 
almost (but never quite) offensive behaviour issues out of a reservoir 
of infinite peculiarity […]" (ibid.: 102). Eccentricity and peculiarity are 
the main elements on which the Yippies rely enlisting their construction 
of non-Judeo-Christian signifiers to stage their protest. As mentioned, 
their effectiveness in evoking significant resonance with decision 
makers remained negligible, wherefore the main message of the 
protest remained its spectacular form, once again actualising the 
mainstream’s gaze on a sight of frivolous eccentricity, peculiarity, and 
"oddness" (ibid.) that expresses itself, at least partly, in terms of 
South Asian religious signifiers. Thus, it is fair to allege that 
countercultural groups utilised and exploited South Asian religious 
signifiers and religious practices in order to shape a form of 
carnivalesque entertainment that posed as a bottom-up intervention 
into politics in order to valorise itself, simultaneously intensifying 
activated stereotypes.  
Also, the usage of South Asian religious signifiers specifically to vent 
desires to participate in spectacular forms of protest strengthens the 
stereotypical link of the "Orient" with religion generally and reflects 
back on the perception of South Asian cultural and religious contexts: 
The deep-set association of South Asia with religion and excessive, 
spectacular religious practices, active in Western societies until today, 






























public absorbs little other information about those non-Western 
cultures. Said identifies a "nineteenth-century tradition of the Orient as 
therapeutic for the West" that also constructs this space as a sight of a 
restoration of a lost Western sense of spirituality (ibid.: 271). The use 
of South Asian religious signifiers for a staged protest recreates the 
essentially colonial image of South Asia as a sphere mainly defined by 
spiritual concerns and by spectacular forms of religious expression 
foreign to the ostensibly rational Westerner divorced from his spiri-
tuality.  
Especially Bloch’s interpretation of the use of religious signifiers to 
reflect the forms of deceit used by the media intimates that the 
evident de-valorisation of these religious practices and signifiers is 
problematic. To echo Said, the use of South Asian religious signifiers 
becomes part of a discursive practice of Orientalism in which the 
essentially untrustworthy and dubious is determined to proceed from 
an imagined space referred to as "the Orient", to which South Asia also 
belongs. Said’s reformulation of an eighteenth-century source comes 
to mind: "Orientals are inveterate liars, they are 'lethargic and 
suspicious', and in everything oppose the clarity, directness, and 
nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race" (ibid.: 39). Here, the fundamental 
ambivalence of the use of South-Asian religious signifiers is reiterated 
and its hegemonic potential actualised.  
The use of South Asian religious signifiers to protest the war speci-
fically points to another aspect that is germane to all of the grievances 
analysed: The conservation and performance of privilege must not be 
viewed as an altogether condemnable act that renders the political 
message of the counterculture void of meaning, automatically disprov-
ing any sincerity of purpose when it comes to transformative politics. 
Much rather, this insistence on retaining privilege and marking it 
visibly for the mainstream to perceive exemplifies that privileged 
individuals are also bound by significant coercions, and that privilege 
does not only limit those at whose expense it is actualised. In other 
words, allying oneself with those that were denied privilege, by sup-
porting their political causes and thereby questioning the system of 
privilege allocation, could have lethal consequences. The cases of the 
sometimes deadly struggles of civil rights activists in the South (Lytle 
2006: 158-60), of students killed in campus protests (Dippel 1996: 
































As shown, South Asian religious signifiers worked as powerful counter-
cultural frames expressing dissent with hegemonic views and policies 
as well as bridging the issues of different countercultural activist 
groups. At the same time, these frames were ambivalent, implicitly re-
sonating with what Stuart Hall would term a "dominant cultural order" 
(Hall 1993: 98). In this manner, the religious concept of karma could 
be used to express opposition to racism, and at the same time activate 
paternalistic vocabularies and discursively intimidate violent pro-
testors. By the same token, the religious practice of communal living 
could provide an escape from the rigid, gender-based social roles 
enforced by a system of patriarchal capitalism, but simultaneously 
create structures that perpetuate the very same imbalances of power 
that determined the mainstream. And correspondingly, the practice of 
the religious spectacle could decry the media’s conservative bias, while 
it was also itself reproducing Orientalist biases and hegemonic notions 
of Western superiority. 
As pointed out in the last section, this ambivalence was not merely a 
cause in itself, but can be explained regarding the hostility toward re-
sistance, which during the decades in question could have dire 
consequences for overtly oppositional dissenters. Nonetheless, the 
appropriation of South Asian religious signifiers in order to navigate 
such difficult circumstances remains problematic, especially since 
many of these frames, reduced to stereotypes, remain in operation 
until today in pop-cultural discourses. Throughout this essay, the 
understanding of the ambivalent frame, fostered by the conceptual 
merger of Frame Theory and Cultural-Studies-based approaches to 
coding processes, has proved helpful in tracing this tension. 
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